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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a decision by the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, District Court Judge Presiding, to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. The appeal is authorized pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1992. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Sexual infidelity by one of the parties during a marriage 
and before a divorce is granted, and such may constitute grounds 
for divorce, and may be relevant in a child custody dispute, 
however, notwithstanding the foregoing, in the absence of 
"cohabitation" occurring after divorce, the issue is not relevant 
to a permanent alimony award. See Haddow v. Haddow/ 707 P2d 669, 
671-672 (Utah 1985). 
2. A party who leads a court into error cannot later 
complain of that error to obtain reversal, see Merriam v. Merriam, 
799 P2d 1172, 1175 (Ut App 1990). Prior to entry of Finding of 
Facts, Conclusions of Law and the Divorce Decree, the court, in the 
instant case, did meet and seek counsels' advice, objection and 
approval of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Divorce Decree. Only after receiving said advice and approval from 
both counsel, did the Court sign and enter the same. Defendant's 
counsel's approval is evidenced by his signing-off on said 
pleading, by affixing his initials thereto. See the Court Minute 
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Entry (T-61) Likewise, without said approval, the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree in the instant case would not 
have been accepted, signed and entered by the Court. The Defendant 
did in effect co-author the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
entered by the Court, and the Defendant did thereby waive his right 
to challenge the adequacy of such findings of fact by the within 
appeal. 
3. The appropriate criteria for an awcird of alimony is as 
follows: the financial condition of the spouse claiming a need for 
alimony, the ability the claiming party to provide such support and 
maintenance for him or herself, and the ability of the responding 
spouse to provide such support. See Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P2d 
952, 958 (Ut Ct Appeals 1988) In the instant case the evidence was 
that the Plaintiff, at all times pertinent hereto, was on Public 
Assistance, she was and is without marketable job skills as a 
result of parties having married right out of high school and 
having children shortly thereafter, the raising of three small 
infant children while maintaining a household for the Defendant has 
substantially diminished Plaintiff's employment alternatives now 
and in the future, and in comparison, at the time of entry of the 
Decree herein, the Defendant had completed nearly Five (5) years of 
post high school or college courses, and the Defendant had a proven 
and established earning capacity far in excess of his regular and 
customary employment, evidenced both by his investment portfolio 
and the relatively large sums of money in his control at the time 
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of the parties' separation. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None 
Counsel for the Appellee urges that Section 30-3-5(6) Utah 
Code Annotated, as Amended is dispositive of any an all of the 
issues Appellee has raised on appeal. Said code section is not 
applicable because it applies to post decree alimony payments to a 
former spouse. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from a 
Third District Court determination that the Appellant pay permanent 
alimony to his former wife of a relationship and marriage that 
lasted nearly Eight (8) years. The parties commenced having a 
sexual affair three years before marriage, when the Plaintiff was 
a junior in high school (T-114). The parties married after the 
Plaintiff was Three (3) months pregnant. The divorce proceeding was 
commenced after the foregoing plus Five (5) years of formal 
marriage and three children later. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiff commenced the divorce proceeding in the Third 
Judicial District Court In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
to dissolve the marriage between herself (Plaintiff/Appellee) and 
her husband (Defendant/Appellant). The matter came on regularly for 
Two and One Half (2 1/2) days of trial on the 4th, 5th and 6th days 
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of December, 1991, before the Honorable John Rokich, District Court 
Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT 
Following the trial of this matter the Third District Court 
awarded, among other things, permanent alimony to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, and from said Court's order awarding permanent 
alimony to the Plaintiff the Defendant/Appellant now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion by 
awarding the Plaintiff permanent alimony. The evidence presented at 
trial showed that the Plaintiff was in need of support and 
maintenance, the Plaintiff lacked, now and in the future, the 
ability to adequately provide such support and maintenance for 
herself and that the Defendant had the ability to provide said 
support for the Plaintiff, and the children. The 
Defendant/Appellant co-authored the Findings of Fact and can not 
now claim error to obtain reversal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant/Appellant, husband was born the 29th day of 
November, 1966. The Plaintiff/Appellee, wife was born the 25th day 
of February, 1967. The parties began having sexual relations Three 
(3) years before their marriage while both were in high school. The 
parties were married on the 30th day of November, 1985. Since the 
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marriage and until the separation of the parties and the 
commencement of the within proceedings the Defendant/Appellant has 
been the primary income provider for the parties, and the Plaintiff 
has worked primarily in the home raising the parties' infant twins 
and elementary age children and maintaining the household. Three 
(3) children have been born as issue of this marriage. The oldest 
child was born on the 18th day of May, 1986. The twins were born on 
the 18th day of July, 1990. The Defendant had left and estranged 
himself from the Plaintiff at the time the twins were born on the 
18th day of July, 1990, and he was living with another woman. (T-
324). The parties formally separated in August, of 1990, and 
between the date of separation in August, 1990, and the trial of 
this matter in December, 1991, the Defendant failed, neglected and 
or refused to pay meaningful support to the Plaintiff, for her 
maintenance, and for the support and maintenance of the parties' 
minor children. The record shows that the Defendant only paid to 
the Plaintiff the sum of Three Hundred Eighty Five ($385.00) 
Dollars on two occasions, other insignificant sums from time to 
time during the period from the parties' separation to the date of 
trial (T-165-172). 
In 1989 the Defendant earned Sixteen Thousand Four Hundred 
Fifty One ($16,451.00) Dollars in wages, Three Thousand Two Hundred 
Seven ($3,207.00) Dollars in dividends or investments for a total 
income for 1989, of Nineteen Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Eight 
($19,658.00) Dollars (T-179). 
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The Defendant's 1990 Income Tax Return, Court Exhibit 4-P, 
reflected numerous investments made by the Defendant while married 
to the Plaintiff (T-180). 
Furthermore, in 1990 while married to the Plaintiff, Defendant 
had on deposit at Valley Bank and Trust, on the 13th day of August 
1990, the sum of $14,472.00, (T-181), and just one month later, 
after the twins were born, and after the divorce proceeding was 
commenced, the said bank balance was $355.00. During the said 
period $14,000.00 was withdrawn from said account, and not one cent 
of that money was used for the use and benefit of the Plaintiff or 
the parties' minor children. (T-181, 187). The Defendant explains 
his failure to provide for the Plaintiff and his minor children by 
stating, "we were separated at the time". The net effect of the 
Defendant's failure to support his wife, the Plaintiff, and their 
three minor children were compelled to apply for, and receive 
public assistance. (T-79) 
In addition to the foregoing, and approximately at the same 
time, the Defendant owned, possessed or controlled a Paine Webber 
Security Account having a balance or value of Nine Thousand 
($9,000.00) Dollars, (See court Exhibit 6-P). The Defendant sold 
the account at a discount and gave Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty 
($7,650.00) Dollars, of the proceeds from said account to his 
father. (T-184, 185). Purportedly to pay a questionable demand note 
that was suddenly called due. 
The Defendant testified that after the twins were born he had 
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and maintained sole use and possession of the following revenues: 
Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars investment income; Fourteen 
Thousand ($14,000.00) Dollars, from the checking account; Seven 
Thousand Five Hundred ($7,500.00) Dollars from the Paine Webber 
Account; and in addition to the foregoing, the Defendant had his 
bi-weekly earnings of Six Hundred Fifty Two ($652.00) Dollars. The 
Defendant further testified that he had expenses of Six Hundred 
($600.00) Dollars per month. The Defendant, during the described 
period, was residing with two women, sharing a bedroom with one, 
and not paying any meaningful support for the Plaintiff or for his 
three minor children.(T-186-189) (T-192-193). 
The Plaintiff did testify to having sexual relations with a 
male friend, who was not residing or living with her. The Plaintiff 
did have and use in her residence a used T.V. and Two (2) chairs 
belonging to the male friend. The arrangement was one of 
convenience, the friend had moved to a new residence and did not 
have room at his new home for the said items. (T-149-152) The 
Plaintiff testified that the said male friend did not live with her 
and her children at her home. (T-151). 
The trial Court heard testimony from the parties and other 
witnesses, reviewed the documentary evidence presented at trial, 
and at the conclusion of the court proceedings declared that the 
Court did not believe the testimony and the evidence of the 
Defendant/Appellant. The Court ordered that counsel for the parties 
prepare proposed findings of fact. That once the findings were 
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prepared the Court would conference with counsel to finalize the 
findings. At said conference the parties' counsel with the Court 
approved the Findings of Fact the subject herein. The approval by 
the Defendant is evidenced by counsel's initials thereon. The 
Defendant, who through that conference, and his approval can not 
now claim error to obtain reversal. See Merriam v. Merriam# 707 
P2d, 669, 671-672 (Utah, 1985). 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ONE 
In the instant case, there can be no question that the 
Plaintiff was not "cohabiting" with a member of the opposite sex 
under the guidelines set forth in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P2d 669 (Ut 
1985), and she certainly was not in violation of Section 30-3-5(6) 
Utah Code Annotated, as Amended, as being a "former wife" receiving 
alimony from the Defendant while residing with a person of the 
opposite sex. He was not living with her. He was not paying 
Plaintiff's utilities. The Plaintiff was under the watchful eye of 
Social Services as well as the Defendant herein, and the record 
fails to show that Plaintiff was cohabiting with her male friend. 
There was testimony by an independent witness, Erick Roosa, called 
by the Defendant to prove cohabitation by the Plaintiff. Mr. Roosa, 
testified that he couldn't say that Plaintiff's friend, Rick 
Onesta, was living in the home with the Plaintiff. Mr. Roosa 
testified as follows, that: "I can't come up with facts, No, I 
can't say that he's actually living there, or anything". (T-234-
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235) 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT TWO 
Paragraph No. 5 of the Findings of Fact sets forth that 
Defendant did not adequately financially support the Plaintiff and 
their minor children.(T-63) 
Paragraph No. 8 of the Findings of Fact sets forth that the 
Defendant was gainfully employed, having the following earnings: 
... earned as an employee of Universal painting during 1990, 
the gross yearly sum of $15,296.00, and presently earns the 
gross amount of $1,387.00 monthly.(T-64) 
In addition to the forgoing, the record is replete with 
Defendant's historical earnings from investments and other sources 
owned and controlled by the Defendant during the marriage and 
concurrently liquidated and paid over to Defendant's father. Said 
payment was purportedly to pay preexisting debt unknown to the 
Plaintiff, and asserted, suspiciously, just as the parties 
separated. (T-182-187) 
Paragraph No. 13 of the Findings of Fact sets forth that the 
Plaintiff was without means or ability to pay for court costs and 
attorneys' fees rendered in this case. (T-64) 
The record at trial established that the Plaintiff was 
receiving public assistance following the separation from the 
Defendant. She was the mother and custodial parent of three small 
children. She has graduated from high school having limited working 
experience, and she has no definable marketable working skills. (T-
110-115) 
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REPLY TO ARGUMENT THREE 
Defendant sets forth self serving statements that were 
answered and noted by the Court, when it observed, that: "He's got 
a credibility gap right now". "He's got a credibility gap, a 
serious one". (T-306) "This is probably one of the most blatant 
cases I have ever had before me in my seven years on the bench". 
The Court in its capacity as fact finder simply didn't believe the 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT FOUR 
Awarding the Plaintiff Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars a month 
permanent alimony and the Defendant calling it a "reward" under the 
facts of this case does beg the need for the Defendant to return to 
college for another Five (5) years of education, and perhaps 
thereafter the Defendant may understand that if it costs him Six 
Hundred ($600.00) to Seven Hundred ($700.00) Dollars a month to 
maintain and feed himself that the Plaintiff and the parties' three 
minor children need more than the Plaintiff has been awarded herein 
to feed and maintain themselves. The debts and obligations claimed 
by the Defendant, including the convenient debts owed to his 
father, can all be discharged in bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant/Appellant, who participated and co-authored the 
Findings of Fact, can not now claim error to obtain a reversal. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee submits that there is adequate basis in 
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fact and law to support the award of permanent alimony in the 
instant case. 
There is evidence in the record that Plaintiff/Appellee's is 
in need of support and maintenance, and that she does not have the 
ability to provide, if ever, said support for herself, and further 
that the Defendant/Appellant does have the income or the capability 
of generating income sufficient to meet his needs and the needs of 
the Plaintiff/Appellee. 
It is cohabitation, and not sexual relations, that is the 
triggering contingency that terminates alimony. A finding of 
cohabitation is not supported by the evidence in the record. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the lower Court determination, and hold that 
Defendant/Appellant be ordered to pay permanent alimony to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, in the sum of $200.00 per month. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this P*^ day of May, 1993. 
/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of May, 1993, two 
true and correct copies of the BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE, was duly 
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served by personally delivering the same to: 
JOHN WALSH 
Attorney at Law 
2319 South Foothill Drive, Suite 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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